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"WE'LL KNOW IT WHEN WE CAN'T HEAR IT":
A CALL FOR A NON-PORNOGRAPHY TEST
APPROACH TO RECOGNIZING
NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION
J. Scott Colesanti*

I.

INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW

Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once authored a concurring
opinion in which he explained that, while he would not attempt to
delineate pornographic materials, he knew pornography when he saw it.'
That test, which is said to have invited sarcasm among the clerks of the

highest bench,2 nonetheless announced a threshold analysis for obscenity
cases that many find appealing to this day.3
Likewise, in the field of insider trading, the courts and others have

embraced such pragmatism, namely, effectively transforming the test for
finding insider trading (trading while aware of "material" and "nonpublic" information) to a weighing of such considerations as whether the
defendant had access to insiders, betrayed a confidence, and/or captured

a profit. Such a pornography test approach-while satisfying on some
level of expedience-fails to provide businesses with certainty, the law

with clarity, the market with confidence, and the layman with guidance.
Meanwhile, the definitional term non-public is reduced to a shibboleth,
The author is a Special Professor at the Hofstra Law School, teaching Securities
Regulation and Broker-DealerRegulation. All views expressed herein are purely personal.
1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
198 (1979) (describing Supreme Court clerks jovially blurting out "[tihat's it, that's it, I know it
when I see it" during the Justices' private screenings of controversial movies as part of adjudicating
obscenity cases).
3. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in JudicialDecisionmaking,42 HOUS.
L. REv. 1381 (2006) (observing that Justice Stewart's dissent was marked by a quality of intuition
and highlighting the usefulness of judicial intuitionism in decisionmaking).
*
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the mere utterance of which triggers insider trading investigations, cases,
penalties, and press.
With instances of the crime both growing in number,4 and
manifestations in novel forms, 5 insider trading and its dire consequences
have once again called into question the legitimate scope of the largely
undefined prohibition. To wit, scandals centering on the theft of
internally-broadcast research 6 and the granting of backdated options to
corporate executives 7 presently highlight the unpredictable applications
of the most feared securities law prohibition. The Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") has, to date, survived
attacks on these unpredictable applications (while garnering a fair share
of headlines) by bringing enforcement actions showcasing exorbitant
profits, salient boardroom details, indefensible criminal acts and

4. The regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") recently estimated, in a
hearing before the Senate, a twenty-five percent rise in referrals of potential insider trading cases to
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the
Problem and Is There Adequate Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Robert Marchman, Executive Vice President, NYSE,
Inc.),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfn?id=2405&witid=5778.
An
independent study conducted by Measuredmarkets, a consulting service that notifies its subscribers
of aberrant stock behavior, concluded that in "more than 40% of the scrutinized mergers, with a
value of $1 billion or more that were announced in the 12-month period ending in early July [of
2006], deviant trading behaviour was evident before the deals became public." Illegal Insider
Trading: How WidespreadIs the Problem and Is There Adequate CriminalEnforcement?: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher K. Thomas,
Principal, Measuredmarkets, Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm
?id=2405&wit-id=5779. At the same hearing, Professor John Coffee of Columbia Law School
testified that competition that "may often resemble the Wild West" for better returns by hedge funds
has resulted in more insider trading. Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is
There Adequate Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of John Coffee, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2405&wit-id=5780.
5. See, e.g., John Hechinger, Prosecutor Forms Task Force to Probe Stock-Option Grants,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2006, at A2 (describing the actions of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of California in "ratcheting up the government's probes of possible manipulation of a form
of executive pay"); Kara Scannell, Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Can CompaniesIssue Options,
Then Good News?: SEC Is Divided on Practice Known as 'Spring Loading:' Critics See 'Insider
Trading', WALL ST. J., July 8-9, 2006, at AI; Shawn Tully, The Street's Next Scandal, FORTUNE,
Mar. 5, 2007, at 20.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53577, at *78, *49 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006) (finding as sufficient an indictment alleging criminal securities
fraud wherein brokerage house employees alleged to have permitted non-employees to "secretly
listen" to their firms' internal "squawk box" system in order to obtain "material, non-public
information concerning large orders to purchase and sell securities" for their institutional clients).
7. See Pui-Wing Tam, Options Scandal Tests the Mettle of a New CEO, WALL ST. J., Aug.
14, 2006, at BI.
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aristocratic defendants. 8 Nonetheless, the dirty little secret of the
"material, non-public information" definition of insider trading is that
the non-public half lacks clarity and consistent application-indeed, it
may not truly exist at all. Consequently, the Commission's winsome
approach is destined to win some and lose some, as the courts, as they
did often in 2006, begin to rule for defendants in cases relying on
definitional vagaries or unprecedented application of the prohibition.
This Article thus urges the Commission to abandon its totality of
the circumstances approach (as well as its lip service to the term nonpublic as a separate definitional element) in favor of a well-defined twotier standard in insider trading cases. Part II of the Article provides a
brief history of the application of Rule lOb-5 to insider trading. Part III
details the specific enigmas occasioned by applications of the
prohibition to varied examples of trading on non-public information, and
highlights some recent decisions refusing to accept the SEC's approach.
Part IV concludes by positing that the primary market regulators (i.e.,
the stock exchanges), with a little help from existing SEC guidance, are
poised to clear up the vagueness and help the SEC or U.S. Attorneys
asserting SEC findings and theories surmount courtroom obstacles.
II.

A HISTORY OF THE INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION
(THE DIRECTOR'S CUT)

It is axiomatic that, despite the crime's ubiquitous presence and
9
ever-growing popularity, insider trading is undefined by statute. A
relatively young juridical construct disappointing to lawyers and laymen

8. See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7976, Exchange Act Release No.
44,305, 74 SEC Docket 2143, 2144 (May 15, 2001); Kurt Eichenwald, Jury Convicts 5 Involved in
Enron Deal with Merrill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at Cl; Jim Hopkins & Jon Swartz, HP Chief
Tackles Boardroom Scandal Head-on, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 2006, at 10A; Jake Ulick, Martha
Indicted, Resigns, http://money.cnn.com/2003/06/04/news/martha indict/index.htm.
9. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §.10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). The
Supreme Court has also commented on the noticeably absent definition:
Notwithstanding the ambiguities surrounding Section 10(b)'s impact on insider
trading-including its very definition--Congress has increased the penalties for
violations of that prohibition. The SEC in turn has failed to promulgate rules outside the
area of tender offers but its decisions have continued to march, in the eyes of one
commentator, to the beat of its own drummer.
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 576 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
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alike, this distinctly American contribution to business regulation is
alternatively found to be intimidating' and worthy of ridicule."
The outlawing of insider trading by the SEC (the "Program") dates
back to an administrative proceeding brought approximately forty-five
years ago. The operative definition of insider trading-tradingwhile
aware of "material, non-public information"--has proven a useful

refrain to jurists, 12 journalists, 13 and authors, 14 but remains a cacophony

to litigants. The result is that those responsible for applying the
prohibition inevitably rely on its pleading requirements or the crime's
results, a task not unlike identifying a speed limit by the cars that passed
by it or the hedges that were overrun. The undesirability of charging this
highly publicized yet amorphous crime in this manner results foremost
from congressional reluctance to commit the crime to paper.
A.

More Outtakes than Intakes

The 1934 Congress did not outlaw insider trading. One explanation
is that such an action would have indirectly targeted members of
Congress themselves.' 5 A less jaded view recalls that the adopting
10.

See, e.g., COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., INSIDER REPORTING AND SHORT-SWING

TRADING, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW REPORT 1527, Part 2, at 3 (Nov. 5, 1992) ("Failure to comply
with the regulatory framework can result in costly litigation and damaged reputations. Familiarity
with legislative, judicial and regulatory pronouncements is a necessity for the corporate insider.").
11. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, The Casefor Insider Trading,WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at
A14 ("[T]he SEC never realized that insider trading was already the form of 'disclosing' that
maintained the efficiency of stock pricing. Instead, they outlawed it. Happily for us all, enforcement
has not been too successful.").
12. See, e.g., In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971) ("All the requisite
elements for the imposition of responsibility were present ....We consider those elements to be
that the information in question be material and non-public ....
").
13. See Andrew Countryman, Stewart Faces Criminal Charges; Insider Trading Case No
Cakewalk for Prosecutors,CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2003, at Cl ("The government would need to prove
that Stewart had important, non-public information when she sold her ImClone shares ....).
14.

See generally DOUGLAS FRANTz, LEVINE & CO.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING

SCANDAL (1987) (describing the rise and fall of one of the most notorious insider traders of the
1980s). See id. at 54 (defining the crime as trading on "private, nonpublic corporate information"
that affects the stock price); JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S DICTIONARY
OF FINANCE 281 (7th ed. 2006) ("[I]t is illegal for insiders to trade based on their knowledge of
material corporate developments that have not been announced publicly ....).
15. See Manne, supra note 11, at A 14. The former dean of George Mason University School
of Law reported: "In 1934 Congress refused an early draft of the Securities and Exchange Act that
contained a provision outlawing insider trading, perhaps because it would have covered members of
Congress." Id. For a thorough history of the legislation's deliberate silence on the topic of insider
trading, see CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 234 (1997) ("The new regulations did
not restrain traders as Wall Street had feared when [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] was being
drafted.... The restrictions placed on short selling and margin trading were thought to be ample to
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committees for the Securities Exchange Act simply embraced the more
"passive" concept of disclosure, stating:
Because it is difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of law between
truly inside information and information generally known by betterinformed investors, the most potent weapon against the abuse of inside
information is full and prompt publicity.... The Committee is aware
that these requirements are not air-tight and that the unscrupulous
insider may still, within the law, use inside information for his own
advantage. It is hoped, however, that the publicity features of the bill
will tend to bring these practices into disrepute and encourage the
voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in
securities are registered on
control of large corporate
16 enterprises whose
the public exchanges.
What Congress did effectuate was section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act, which established reporting requirements (and an
attendant statutory remedy) compelling officers, directors, and "ten
percent shareholders" to: 1) timely disclose their purchases and sales in
the stock of the company they inhabited, and 2) disgorge profits from
purchases and sales of their company's stock less than six months
apart.17 Among the criticisms of section 16(b)'s approach were that it
was limited by its concern only with public corporations, its mild
penalty of a shareholder cause of action to seek the relinquishing of
profits, and its denial of a cause of action to the SEC for disgorgement of
profits.1 8 Significantly, the text of section 16(b) commenced with a
mission statement: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of

prevent abuses of the past from flaring up again."). Other authors perhaps gild the lily of
congressional inaction by portraying the legislative silence as part of a grander plan. See JONATHAN
MORELAND, PROFIT FROM LEGAL INSIDER TRADING: INVEST TODAY ON TOMORROW'S NEWS 1

(2000) ("When the U.S. Congress of 1934 legislated the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) into existence to protect individual investors, it realized that corporate executives had an
unfair advantage when trading their own company's shares.... In lieu of banning insider
transactions, Congress dictated disclosure.").
16. H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)-(b) (2000).
18. Section 16 only applies to companies registered on a national securities exchange, and
only requires that enumerated parties profiting from purchases and sales of company shares within a
rolling six-month window return those profits to the company, leading some commentators to opine
that the provision is toothless. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 893 (1983) ("The effect of section 16 on shareholders'
welfare, therefore, is ambiguous.").
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information... ;,19 until the 1980s, this preamble remained the only
reference to inside information in the Securities Exchange Act.
The SEC's adoption of its famed Rule lOb-5 in 194220 was in direct
response to the securities laws' inability to reach pernicious purchases,
namely the buyback by the president of a private company (an "insider")
of floundering shares from his co-investors under the guise of continued
weak economic results. 2 1 Violations of the generic anti-fraud prohibition

have since been held to a list of pleading requirements that were
announced, restated or implicitly approved by the Supreme Court over

the years to include materiality, 22 scienter,23 causation, 24 fraud or
deception, 25 and satisfaction of the regulation's "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" language.26 The materiality element,

often most expediently defined as the effect of the subject inside
information on market price,27 has often dominated considerations.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
20. Although universally feared by traders, Rule 1Ob-5 does not expressly refer to insider
trading. The full text of the rule is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
corresponding Rule 1Ob-5 are often charged together in both civil and criminal proceedings. It is
rarely specified which of Rule lOb-5's three prohibitions applies to the insider trading in issue. See
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961) (noting that the tippee's practices "at least
violated clause (3) as a practice which operated as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers"); see also
United States v. Finnerty, No. 05 Cr. 393, slip op. at 18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2007) (discussing the
case against a NYSE Specialist alleged to have "interpositioned" his interest by trading ahead of
customer orders said to violate, if any, clauses (a) and (c) of the Rule).
21. Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures,22 Bus. LAW. 891,922-23 (1967).
22. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-53 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
23. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
24. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
25. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,471-74 (1977).
26. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-25 (2002).
27. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (stating that materiality was said
to rely on those facts "which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the
corporation's stock or securities").
28. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 n.8 (2d Cir. 1986) ("In any event, a
fraudulent scheme need not be foolproof to constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5. It is enough that
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Further, various elements have been deemed satisfied by the
conspicuous nature of the defendant's ultimate trading.29
In 1961, acting foremost on considerations of fairness, the SEC
commenced the Program by bringing a modest action within its own
four walls that applied Rule 1Ob-5 to the trading caused by J. Cheever
Cowdin, a board member of Curtiss-Wright Company. Cowdin was also
a broker at Cady, Roberts & Co., a stock brokerage. 30 When he heard of
an imminent dividend reduction at the Curtiss-Wright board meeting, he
notified Robert Gintel, a fellow broker at the brokerage. In anticipation
of a price decrease, Gintel immediately started selling Curtiss-Wright
stock in his personal and discretionary accounts. A transmission error
delayed the news of the dividend reduction to the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and Gintel's quick trades effectively jumped ahead
of the market. 3
In finding the trading violative, Cady, Roberts noted that "a special
obligation has been traditionally required of corporate insiders, 32 and
held that Rule 1Ob-5 is violated (even in faceless transactions on a stock
exchange) when a buyer or seller trades without disclosing the inside
information he possesses. Drawing upon authorities ranging from Judge
Learned Hand 33 to the NYSE guidance for its listed companies, 34 the
SEC decision did not define "inside information," instead referring
generally to the "affirmative duty to disclose material information.
Elsewhere, the decision characterized the dividend reduction information
as information that "Gintel knew was not public. 36
Cady, Roberts broke new ground in several areas by creating the
"abstain or disclose" rule for "corporate insiders," 37 and serving notice
appellants reasonably expected to and generally did reap profits by trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information misappropriated from [one defendant's employer].").
29. See, e.g., In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Insider
trading [i.e., trading by corporate insiders] in suspicious amounts or at suspicious times is probative
of bad faith and scienter.").
30. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 909 (1961).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 912-15.
33. See id. at 914 n.23.
34. Seeid. at915.
35. Id.at911.
at916.
36. Id.
37.
We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons
with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.
Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud
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upon corporate boards that their previous opportunism was now illegal.
But it was only an administrative proceeding. Seven years later, the SEC
obtained federal court imprimatur on the Program in the Second
38
Circuit's famed case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ("TGS"),
affirming the liability of certain defendants (and expanding liability to
others) in a case involving employees of a mining company who had
traded in advance of news of successful drilling
results in Canada that
39
jumped company stock nearly ninety percent.
TGS coined the phrase "material inside information"4 0 and
represented federal court approval of the seminal steps of the Program.
In finding that the trading by the respondents violated Rule lOb-5, the
Second Circuit "expand[ed] the limited protection afforded outside
investors by the trial court's narrow definition of materiality.'
The
non-public nature of the subject information was only addressed
indirectly, through the appellate court's oblique references to terms such
as "information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, ,,42
"the uninformed investing public," and the public's "unequal access to
knowledge. 43 TGS was not exactly written on a blank slate, as preexisting SEC Rule 405 (for purposes of the Securities Act of 1933) had
defined material as "those matters to which there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in
determining whether to purchase the security registered.", 44 However, the
court relied instead on congressional intent in federalizing the new
crime:

provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be
improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forgo the
transaction.
Id. at 911 (citing Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13
S.E.C. 373, 380-81 (filed 1943)) (footnote omitted).
38. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
39. Id. at 842-43. The Supreme Court later ratified the court's definition of material in TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that information is material if
there is "a substantial likelihood that, under all circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder"). The TSC Industries holding
has been generally referred to as the "total mix" test. See JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN &
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 884 (5th ed. 2006).
40. TGS, 401 F.2d at 839.
41. Id. at 851.
42. Id.at 848 (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912).
43. Id. at 852.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2006).
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The core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional
purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of
participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress
that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical
market risks .... The insiders here were not trading on an equal
footing with the outside investors.... Such inequities based upon
unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable
in view of the congressional concern in the area,
in our way of life, or,
45
remain uncorrected.

Less than a year after TGS, the "material inside information"
definition was cited in a shareholder complaint against corporate officers
in a state derivative action premised upon considerations under "Federal
law."A6 By the late 1960s, the Program still focused on the actions of
insiders (i.e., those who could be said to possess a fiduciary duty to the
company's shareholders).
B. Losing Focus
In the 1970s, the Program enjoyed a string of legal victories,
successfully applying Rule 1Ob-5 as an insider trading prohibition to the
activities of, among others, a CEO and his secretary-treasurer,4 7 a
printer a4 government agents,4 9 and a student marketing corporation
(along with its officers, accountants, and attorneys).50 Class action
plaintiffs lacking privity with the defendants 5' joined the litigious
banquet after the Supreme Court quietly ratified a lower court's creation
of an implied cause of action based upon the SEC rule. Over time, a
45. TGS, 401 F.2d at 851-52.
46. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. 1969). The New York Court of
Appeals eagerly utilized its equitable powers to grow the law to accommodate the new spirit of the
federal securities laws, stating:
In the present case, the defendants may be able to avoid liability to the corporation
under section 16(b) of the Federal law since they had held the MAI shares for more than
six months prior to the sales. Nevertheless, the alleged use of the inside information to
dispose of their stock at a price considerably higher than its known value constituted the
same sort of "abuse of a fiduciary relationship" as is condemned by the Federal law.
Id. at 914.
47. SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1976).
48. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199, 201 (2d Cir. 1984).
49. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972).
50. See SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 715 (D.D.C. 1978).
51. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
52. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (stating that
it was "established" that a private cause of action under Rule lob-5 existed); see also Kardon v.
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curious side effect was the expansion of subject knowledge from issuer
information to market information. Thus, news of a market player (i.e.,
an "outsider") planning to acquire a block of stock grew to rival
information about the issuer of the stock itself, the common denominator
being whether the price moved appreciably after the public learned the
news. 53 The more curious side effect was the ensnaring of those outside
the boardroom, based upon the informational asymmetry-mere
54
possession of information not similarly possessed by the market.
As the Program expanded exponentially, the signs of court unrest
similarly grew, and the dangers of entrusting the totality of the
circumstances to the outrage of the triers of fact became evident. In SEC
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,55 a case involving the CEO of the company that
patented the famed "Soflens" vision aid, two courts found against the
Commission on allegations that a select group of analysts had been
tipped with negative news. Prior to the trial, some of the analysts had
already consented to Rule IOb-5 violations. Nonetheless, the district
court judge exonerated the CEO and the company, ruling that the CEO
(who had not engaged in any trading) was "a defendant who cannot
fairly be described as a man 'full of cunning and guile.,,' 56 On appeal,
the Second Circuit agreed, declaring that the Commission's coloring of

Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The subsequent proliferation of lOb-5 lawsuits
prompted the Court less than five years later to comment that private rights of action under the
securities laws were "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
53. One critic of Wall Street's practices in the 1990s phrased the gamut of prized data as
such:
Most precious of all is inside information, which comes in many forms. The most
famous kind is news about some dramatic business development, like an unexpected
drop in profits, or a takeover attempt, or an imminent indictment. Obviously, whoever
knows this before the public can make big money when the news hits the Street. But
that's not the only kind of inside info that can be turned into ready money. News that a
brokers' research department is about to recommend Intel, or that a client is about to
place an order for a million shares of IBM, can be valuable to the firm's trading desk,
which can take a position ahead of the event and profit from the ensuing price thrust as
the news spreads.
DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM 99 (1997). Indeed, the recent
criminal cases against and civil sanctions of the specialist firms that operated the NYSE trading
floor highlighted the value of market "news" that lasted less than two minutes (i.e., order flow from
customers). See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
54. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (rejecting the parity of
information theory and reiterating that silence alone is not an adequate basis to impute liability to an
outsider without there first existing a fiduciary relationship).
55. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), affig 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
56. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F. Supp. at 1228.
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an eleven-point stock drop after the alleged tip was a "facile inference"
when viewed against the stock's forty-point decline in the immediately
preceding weeks. 57 Most enlightening was that the Southern District
decried the lack of any applicable definition, as evidenced by the
following passage:
This Court is not the first to suggest that the SEC provide concrete
guidance. In 1969, then [SEC] Commissioner Smith observed:
In the Texas Gulf case itself the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit suggested that the Commission promulgate further
rules to clarify how soon after a public announcement insiders
may trade upon the basis of important information contained in the
announcement. Since then, thoughtful persons have lined up on
both sides of the question of whether rules or guidelines are really
feasible or desirable. Recently, the press gave coverage to my own
comment sympathizing with those urging that an effort be made at
devising guidelines in the area of inside information.
Too often, it seems to me, we debate abstractly among
ourselves whether or not something is feasible or desirable but
never get down to trying it. Instead of continuing the debate, or
whatever you want to call it, over guidelines, perhaps we should
set forth a systematic discussion of this particular segment of the
insider information area. We should not delude ourselves that the
attempt will necessarily be successful or that it is a simple matter.
The trouble with any rulemaking process, as anyone who has lived
through it must know, is that when you start drafting specific
rules, it leaves room for and gives access to doing the very thing
you are trying to prevent. That doesn't bely [sic] the need to make
the effort, but we can't assume that it is a simple chore or one that
will necessarily provide any greater degree of certitude than we
now have. A well researched, ranging treatment of the subject by
the Commission might not end up more informative or much
different than many of the guidelines that have already been
suggested by private individuals and groups. They would,
however, bear an authoritative basis that could give some
guidance and assurance to the many persons of integrity who are
eager to comply with the law. The Commission, in my opinion,
every effort to provide guidance where that is
should make
58
possible.

57. Bausch & Lomb, 565 F.2d at 11, 15.
58. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F. Supp. at 1245 n.5.
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That guidance never came and, in the early 1980s, two noteworthy
setbacks at the nation's highest bench called into question the SEC's
drive to expand its net to catch all individuals, be they insiders or
outsiders. Cady, Roberts had applied Rule 1Ob-5 only to board members,
a group that, although expanded by TGS to include all company
employees, still owed a duty to shareholders and, more importantly, still
constituted but a fraction of the market. In a criminal case, Chiarellav.
United States,59 an employee of a financial printing firm (who was
completely unattached to the companies he traded) was able to decipher
five encoded announcements of takeover bids and purchase stock in the
target companies ahead of the publication of the news. Chiarella, who
earned over $30,000 in a little more than a year by these practices, was
ultimately fired by his employer and forced by SEC consent decree to
return his profits; his criminal indictment and conviction followed.6 °
In overturning Chiarella's conviction, the Supreme Court, noting
that the proceeding was the first criminal case premised on a buyer's
non-disclosure, 6' highlighted his status as a "complete stranger" to other
market participants.6 2 The Court expressed its desire to cabin the
Program, acknowledging that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act is a catchall provision, but adding that "what it catches must be
fraud., 63 Most important to the SEC, the Court rejected the "parity of
information theory," under which the jury had been informed that
Chiarella "owed a duty to everyone; to all sellers, indeed, to the market
as a whole. '64 Moreover, several years later, the SEC brought an action
under section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 against the head coach of the
University of Oklahoma football team after he bought shares. 65 An
Oklahoma judge exonerated him, finding that, although the coach spoke
to a board member several times at a track meet, the coach actually
learned of the inside information while resting supine on a bleacher near
the source's conversation with a third party,
and thus was excepted from
66
"eavesdropper.,
an
as
reach
Rule 1Ob-5's

59. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
60. Id. at 224-25.
61. Id. at 235 n.20. Chiarella received a sentence of one year in prison, which was suspended
except for one month. Id.
62. Id.at232-33.
63. Id. at 234, 235.
64. Id.at231.
65. SEC v.Switzer, 590 F.Supp. 756, 757-58 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
66. Id. at762, 766.
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Likewise, in Dirks v. SEC,67 a securities analyst prevailed in
avoiding an SEC censure after using confidential information imparted
by a whistleblower to help his clients unwind positions in a public
company. The Commission charged the analyst-who did not trade for
himself-with aiding and abetting violations of Rule 1Ob-5 (and its
Securities Act equivalent, section 17).68 The Court overturned the
minimal penalty of a censure and took the occasion to remind the
Commission:
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to
disclose where the person who has traded on inside information "was
not [the corporation's] agent.... was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a
person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and
confidence." Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, we
recognized, would "depar[t] radically from the established doctrine
that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties" and
would amount to "recognizing a general duty between all participants
to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
in market transactions
69
information."
In response to the loss in Chiarella, the Commission adopted Rule
14e-3, which outlawed trading by anyone "in possession of material
information" relating to another's tender offer when such information is
known (or should be known) to be non-public and acquired from the
broadly defined "offering person., 70 The Rule-which has endured
many constitutional attacks7 '-in design and effect-was to serve as a
prophylactic approach to the possession of merger information;
nonetheless, the Rule hinted at the Commission's concern with the
ambiguous nature of non-public information by expressly providing the
accused with a defense where "within a reasonable time prior to any

67. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
68. Id. at 650-52.
69. Id. at 654-55 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). In denying the SEC victory, the
Dirks court nonetheless advanced the Commission's program by delineating the dual two-part tests
that continue to establish tipper/tippee liability. Also, the Dirks opinion inspired a third theory to
cover "certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation," id. at 655 n. 14, termed
the "constructive insider" theory (now more commonly referred to as the "temporary insider"
theory), SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2006).
71. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
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purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed
by press release or otherwise. 72
C. Stepping "Outside"
Despite the setbacks in Chiarella and Dirks, the Commission
continued to believe that the Program must apply equally to insiders and
outsiders, for two reasons: 1) that the latter group could be utilized to
effectuate the plans of the former, and 2) that the outsiders (like insiders)
would benefit unfairly.7 3 The "misappropriation theory," inspired in
spirit and name by Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella,74 thus
provided the academic conduit to utilizing unethical behavior to ensure
that the government could reach the activities of any individual trading
the shares of the company whose stock price skyrocketed or plunged.
Simply stated, the theory holds that Rule 1Ob-5 is violated when a
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, violates a
fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information-more accurately,
any source of information to whom a duty can be found.7 5 In a
celebrated case involving a Wall Street Journalreporter, the government
put forth the theory that the journalist had effectively stolen the timing
and tenor of his own forthcoming column.7 6 In various other cases, the
victimized source of information was an employer.77 In a noted criminal
case brought in the Second Circuit, a son was found to have

72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a)(3) (2006).
73. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24, 599, 73 SEC Docket 1, 4 (Aug.
15, 2000) (describing the Commission's goal of eradicating situations where "a privileged few gain
an informational edge-and the ability to use that edge to profit-from their superior access to
corporate insiders, rather from their skill, acumen, or diligence").
74. Chief Justice Burger quoted: "'Any time information is acquired by an illegal act it would
seem that there should be a duty to disclose that information."' Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 240 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Page Keaton, Fraud-Concealmentand Nondisclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1936)). He continued: "I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
to encompass and build on this principle: to mean that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading." Id.
75. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 96 (1999). The
misappropriation was accepted by the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 1617 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1987). By splitting 4-4 on the securities
fraud charges, the Justices effectively upheld the Second Circuit's affirmance of the convictions of
journalist R. Foster Winans and his tippees on all grounds. See id. at 24.
77. See infra notes 87, 90 and accompanying text.
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misappropriated merger information from his father, a member of the
subject company's board.78
Concurrently in the 1980s, partially in response to much-publicized
insider trading scandals, 79 Congress twice accepted the challenge of
amending the securities laws to strengthen the Program and the position
of civil plaintiffs alike. Despite increasing penalties, identifying victims
of "fraud on the market," and imposing supervisory and procedural
obligations on financial service providers, the legislative body refused to
define the crime.8 ° Specifically, in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, Congress wrote the dual element refrain into law for purposes of
setting SEC penalties, but did not define material or non-public.81 Four
years later, in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988, Congress extended the liability of insider traders to all
"contemporaneous traders" and imposed duties on financial firms to
implement procedures designed to detect and prevent insider trading, but
again did not define insider trading or its key components. 82 Thus, key
terms remained judge-made, and the judge-made prohibition retained its
flaws.
The 1980s saw the Program surge forward, fueled by noteworthy
indictments of targets ranging from another opportunistic financial

78. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the
functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship could exist where a father and son, as the
indictment alleged, were in a "confidential relationship," demonstrated inter alia by the fact that
they "frequently discussed" business affairs).
79. See, e.g., Boesky, Exchange Act Release No. 23,802, 37 SEC Docket 78, 78-79 (Nov. 14,
1986) (consenting to, among other things, payment of fimes and penalties in the amount of $100
million); Milken, Litigation Release No. 12,454, 46 SEC Docket 145, 147 (Apr. 24, 1990)
(consenting to, among other things, fines and penalties of $400 million).
80. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982)), amended by Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA"), Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677, 4679; (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(t) (2000)). The records of the debate on the latter piece of legislation amply evidence
Congress's hesitancy to overreach and concurrent unwillingness to codify what jurists had
constructed: "While the legislation increases the sanctions for insider trading, by not altering the
underlying standards for determining what constitutes insider trading, it is my belief that this
legislation will not curtail the flow of information to the securities markets." 134 CONG. REC.
H7468 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Rinaldo).
81. 98 Stat. at 1264 (authorizing SEC penalties against any party violating the Securities
Exchange Act "by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic
information," as well as the relief of treble damages therefore).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (2000), which created an express cause of action for private
parties as "contemporaneous traders" with insider traders, and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(f), 78t(a) (2000),
which together establish control person liability for their employers.
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printer83 to President Reagan's Deputy Secretary of Defense.8 4 Certain
procedural requirements were so attenuated as to disappear, such as the
requirement under Dirks that a tipper be found to have obtained a
"benefit" from his tip. 85 At decade's end, the Second Circuit reiterated
its support for the misappropriation theory by finding a psychiatrist
guilty of insider trading based upon a tip gleaned from a patient's
therapy session.86
After the Supreme Court deadlocked on the soundness of the theory
in 1987,87 the government steadfastly continued on a path towards
eventual reconsideration by the high court, along the way racking up
victories in select circuits. But the path was not without pitfall. Several
circuits opposed the new reach of the Program, some with appreciable
venom. In 1994, the Fourth Circuit refused to find the machinations of a
state lottery director within Rule 1Ob-5's grasp, holding that the
misappropriation theory, by treading so randomly on the varied terrain
of "fiduciary" duties, made investors "the targets of ad hoc decisionmaking or pawns in an overall litigation strategy known only to the
SEC.",88 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit dismissed all criminal charges
(including money laundering) against a felon because application of the
misappropriation theory was seen to be against "venerable" precedent
and imposing liability "even though no market participant was deceived
or defrauded., 89 Even the Commission-friendly Second Circuit-which
had embraced the misappropriation theory first 9 -- found cause to have
83. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. See Thayer, Litigation Release No. 11,992, 42 SEC Docket 1208, 1208 (1989).
85. See Gaspar, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004, at 90,979
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1985) (explaining that a corporate officer who provided information to the
writer of an industry newsletter was found to do so in order to gain "a reputational benefit").
86. United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 271-72, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that
"when Dr. Willis purchased... securities on the basis of his patient's confidential information, he
defrauded his patient").
87. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 22-24 (1987) (holding that the co-author of a
weekly Wall Street Journalcolumn was guilty of mail and wire fraud for having stolen the "timing
contents" of his own column through an insider trading scheme; the Rule IOb-5 conviction was
upheld by the Second Circuit when justices deadlocked at 4-4 on the applicability of the securities
laws to the crime).
88. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit further found
the theory "irreconcilable with applicable Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 944.
89. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 1996). Interestingly, the Eighth
Circuit opinion termed the information at issue "privileged" and "confidential," but not non-public.
Id. at 628.
90. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15-17 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that investment
bankers violated fiduciary duties to both their employer and their clients by using confidential
information for trading purposes).
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pause when the law's reach seemed a stretch; namely, the appellate court
(sitting en banc) exonerated a stockbroker tipped by a client who, in the
eyes of the government, had allegedly misappropriated the information
from his wife. 9'
Yet the Program persisted in its goal of reaching both halves of the
market, and, in 1997, finally obtained Supreme Court approval of the
misappropriation theory in a case showcasing perhaps the least
sympathetic 1Ob-5 defendant of all time. James O'Hagan was a partner
in a prominent law firm who learned from his employer that a client,
Grand Met, was going to takeover Pillsbury. During the next few weeks,
O'Hagan made a bid to comer the market for options on Pillsbury stock
and ultimately profited
over $4.3 million from the eventual public news
92
of the takeover.
O'Hagan was charged with insider trading (based upon violations
of both Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3) on the theory that he had stolen the
information from either his employer or Grand, or from them both. It is
noteworthy that, even before the Supreme Court heard his appeal,
O'Hagan had been convicted of embezzlement by a state court. 93 Faced
squarely with the choice to convict or not convict a convicted felon, the
Supreme Court found his actions to come within the securities laws.
Among other noteworthy findings, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion
(which was joined by five other Justices) found the nagging 10b-5
pleading requirement of fraud or deception to be satisfied by O'Hagan's
"feigning fidelity" to his employer by showing up at work each day and
remaining silent about his trading. 94 Regardless of any academic
gymnastics, the case forms both the present underpinning and reach of
the Program, which presently outlaws trading based upon material, nonpublic information by insiders (who owe a duty to shareholders) 95 and

91. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570-71 (2dCir. 1991) (en banc). But see United
States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding a psychiatrist to have violated the
duty of confidentiality to his patient when he used information from a therapy session to trade).
Commentators have noted that Willis actually stands for the ability of a misappropriation analysis to
redefine the underlying fiduciary duty, as the psychiatrist's trading was not a breach of the duty of
confidentiality. See Steven A. Ramirez & Christopher M. Gilbert, The MisappropriationTheory of
Insider Trading Under United States v. O'Hagan: Why Its Bark Is Worse Than Its Bite, 26 SEC.
REG. L.J. 162, 183-84 (1998).
92. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1997).
93. Id. at 648 n.2.
94. Id. at 655.
95. Id. at651-52.
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everyone else who is found to owe a duty of confidentiality to the source
of their information.96
Several other developments round out the Program's history. The
Supreme Court in recent years has substantially lowered the bar for 1Ob5 actions by weakening three of the elements required to plead the
violation: 1) an actual purchase or sale, 2) fraud or deception, and 3)
activity "in connection with" the purchase or sale.97 Finally, in October
2000, the Commission adopted three measures aimed at lightening its
load at insider trading trials by: 1) outlawing selective disclosure of
corporate information by management, 98 2) clarifying that insider trading
defendants need only be aware of the subject information (as opposed to
showing they relied upon or used it),99 and 3) expressly recognizing
familial and confidential relationships as predicates for the
misappropriation theory °0 (in response to the question of whether a
husband could steal inside information from his wife). 0 1 It is, thus, on
this difficult combination of SEC rule and judge-made law that the
Program proceeds.
But O'Hagan did not enjoy the peaceful slumber of Supreme Court
precedents. Critics were quick to point out that, by focusing on any
fiduciary duty, the decision hopelessly ties a federal prohibition to a state
law concept. Further, the sanctioned approach effectively creates a
novel, triangular analysis that punishes parties for a breach of a duty to
the source of the information that somehow harmed a third party (i.e.,
96. Id. at 652-53.
97. In the OHagan case, Justice Ginsburg found Rule lOb-5's fraud or deception element
satisfied by the defendant showing up to work each day ("feigning fidelity"). Id. at 655. In 2002, the
Court refused to continue to hold lOb-5 actions to the Rule's "'in connection with the purchase or
sale"' limitation, stating that in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, "Congress sought 'to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a
high standard of business ethics in the securities industry' (and so found the Rule a proper remedy
for a thief whose theft involved no trading). SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002)
(overturning the Fourth Circuit's holding that outright theft merely incidental to the maintenance of
a securities brokerage account was not "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities")
(quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quotation omitted)). In
March 2006, the Court effectively reversed the purchase or sale requirement (commonly referred to
as "the Birnbaum Rule" from Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952))
by deciding in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1514 (2006),
that state class actions alleging securities fraud brought by plaintiffs who had not purchased or sold
were nonetheless pre-empted by the federal Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
§ 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2000).
98. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103 (2006).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 243.10b5-1 (2006).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 243.10b5-2 (2006).
101. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567-71 (2d Cir. 1991).
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"the market").10 2 The two dissenting opinions in O'Hagan found many
flaws in the majority's reasoning, a chief one being:
Even if it is true that trading on nonpublic information hurts the public,
it is true whether or not there is any deception of the source of the
information. Moreover, as we have repeatedly held,0 use
of nonpublic
3
information to trade is not itself a violation of § 10b.1
D. The Vanishing Duty
It seemed only time, therefore, before jurists chose to weaken the
0 'Haganprecedent. Stated more bluntly: What would a federal court do
when the defendant did not evidence O'Hagan's criminality and the
government did not have Rule 14e-3 to fall back on? One noteworthy
example comes from a California district court in February 2006. 04 J.
Thomas Talbot, the director of Fidelity National Financial, Inc., a
publicly traded title insurance corporation, obtained summary judgment
against the SEC after being charged with violating Rule 1Ob-5 by
earning approximately $67,000 in profits trading on the boardroom news
that LendingTree, Inc., (an online realty mortgage corporation) would be
seeking a merger with a third party. Fidelity owned between eight and
ten percent of LendingTree at the time, and earlier in the year had even
been approached as a possible acquirer of LendingTree.' 0 5 Among other
things, the California court held that, while the information of the likely
merger was non-public despite flowing through a number of officers at
both Fidelity and LendingTree, there was no explicit acceptance by
Fidelity or its agents to maintain LendingTree acquisition confidentiality
and also no implied duty of confidentiality under law. 10 6 Absent an
express or implied fiduciary duty of Fidelity to LendingTree, there could
be no breach of a duty by Talbot-an outsider-and no resulting liability
under the misappropriation theory.
In Talbot, the totality of the circumstances approach clearly worked
to the SEC's disadvantage. The respondent, a seventy-year-old man with
an economics degree from Stanford (in addition to his law degree) who
possessed thirty years experience on corporate boards, had traded on two

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
Id. at 690-91 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
Id. at 1031-33 & 1033 n.9.
Id. at 1046.
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dates subsequent to learning of news of a possible acquisition.10 7 Shortly
after his trading commenced, LendingTree forwarded a "tender offer
letter," a confidentiality provision which restricted Fidelity's use of
information received in connection with the still non-public merger. Five
days later, Talbot bought more LendingTree stock. Despite the
defendant's persistent trading, the judge-in the spirit of Potter
Stewart-not only refused to find any obscenity in Talbot's profits, but
also awarded him costs. 01 8
Putting aside considerations of materiality and the satisfaction of
the "in connection with" 1Ob-5 element, the Talbot decision relied more
heavily on the lack of any express duty to the Fidelity board or
LendingTree at the time of the board meeting to keep the boardroom
discussion confidential.10 9 The irony here should not be glossed over:
The SEC, which had commenced its insider trading enforcement
program by focusing on those in attendance of a closed board meeting,
after working so long and hard to expand the scope of that program to
include those outside the boardroom," l0 lost an insider trading case
against someone in the boardroom. At the very least, the Program's hard
fought victory in O'Hagan has become suspect, as the California bench
refused to equate Fidelity's duty to LendingTree (or Talbot's duty to
Fidelity) with O'Hagan's duty to his law firm."'1
E. Economic and MoralRationalefor the Program
Despite the SEC's success in legal forums and attendant internal
rulemaking, the insider trading prohibition commenced and continues on
a questionable economic premise: A share's price reflects all public
information on an individual stock. Such a cornerstone, while viscerally
appealing, does not comport with traditional, European economic
thought, which often posited that a share price reflected all information,
public or otherwise."12 The incongruity has prompted this stark
disclosure by one former SEC Commissioner:
107. Id. at 1032, 1035.
108. SEC v. Talbot, No. 04-04556, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28399, at *95 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
109. See Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-64.
110. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,652-53 (1997).
111. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
112. French economist Louis Bachelier (1870-1946) is credited with popularizing the "efficient
market hypothesis," a precept which posits that "stock market prices are the best available estimates
of the real value of shares since the market has taken account of all available information on an
individual

stock."

JENNIFER BOTHAMLEY,

DICTIONARY OF THEORIES

168 (1993).

Modem

American prosecutors thus espouse--either knowingly or unknowingly-the "semi-strong" theorem
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559

Many securities industry professionals have questioned this [efficient
market] theory, or at least its applicability to stocks that are not traded
on a major securities exchange or actively followed by analysts.
If the efficient market theory were true, it would be possible to
conclude that a government mandated disclosure system is
unnecessary and that a large portion of the SEC's enforcement
program is irrelevant. Particularly suspect would be the Commission's
devotion to the elimination of trading
on inside information on the
113
premise that such trading is unfair.
Regardless of any questionable economic premise, it seems clear
that the insider trading prohibition comes from the desire of wellmeaning government officials to create a stock market that echoed
egalitarian principles permeating our democratic society. In the roughly
forty-five years since Cady, Roberts, that desire has been both fortified
and expanded. The ideal occupies a place of prominence on the SEC
agenda that was perhaps best summarized by the agency's Chairman in
1998:
Our markets are strong because investors are confident of their
basic fairness. Trading on inside information-and giving early tips to
other potential traders--damages the entire structure of our markets,
because it deeply shakes this vital investor confidence. It can
especially demoralize individual investors.
Our law has no tolerance for favoritism. It holds no place for
privilege. Everyone deserves a fair shot at success in our nation's
securities markets.
Well-connected people don't deserve any greater chance for
success than the average citizen. Nor do the friends and relatives of
those well-placed people, who may reap unfair profits because they
happen to know the news before it breaks.

of the efficient market hypothesis; such theorem alters the hypothesis to assume that the market can
only factor in public information on any individual stock. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM
WALK DOwN WALL STREET 189-91 (1996). The traditional analysis continued to appeal to market
professionals at least until recent decades. See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 84 (1979) ("The strong form of the efficient

market hypothesis asserts that prices also reflect what may not be publicly known.").
113.

ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 258 (1982).
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114

That well-meaning prohibition has twice in recent decades escaped
definition by Congress," 5 leaving intact the traditional "material and
non-public" approach of TGS. Such a largely undefined, common law
tone in case law," 6 regulatory disciplinary
standard continues to set the 11
7 and SEC actions. 8
decisions,1
But two interrelated questions are begged: 1) What is non-public
information?, and 2) How does one know when one has obtained it?
These questions grow in significance when one considers the battles lost
by the Program and the lack of clarity in its predicate terms. It bears
noting that jurists forced to continually weigh the totality of the
circumstances put before them are apt to seize upon any weaknesses or
incongruities in the insider trading definition, bringing all discussion
back to the vagueness of that premise.

III.

"NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION": NO ONE KNOWS IT
WHEN THEY SEE IT

Just what qualifies as "non-public?" In the broad context of nonpublic offerings exempt from securities registration, both the SEC and
foe were surprised by the Supreme Court's holding in 1953 that a
securities offering, to be public, "need not be open to the whole
world."' 19 In reaching its conclusion that the determinant is whether a
company's employees were able to "fend for themselves" through access
114. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence
by Fighting Insider Trading, Remarks at "S.E.C. Speaks" Conference (Feb. 27, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt.
115. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. ITSFEA has perhaps had its biggest impact
on the written procedures of brokerage firms, which face SEC action for inadequate procedures
even in the absence of a resultant violation. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Morgan Stanley
with Failure to Maintain and Enforce Policies to Prevent Misuse of Inside Information (June 27,
2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-103.htm ("Despite the legal requirements to do
so, Morgan Stanley for years failed to maintain and enforce adequate written policies and
procedures to prevent the misuse of material nonpublic information, commonly referred to as inside
information.").
116. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 89-52, at I (June 5, 1989),
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/89-050.pdf (explaining that a firm was fined by the NYSE
for failing to provide for appropriate supervisory control "to assure that material non-public
information was not improperly disseminated within the firm").
118. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint 12, SEC v. Waksal, No. 02 Civ. 4407 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 10, 2003) ("The information Sam Waksal received on December 26 and 27, 2001 ...was
material and non-public.").
119. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123 (1953).
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to financial data normally found in a registration statement, the Court
expressly rejected the Commission's contention that a bright line
purchasers) could distinguish public from nonnumber (e.g., twenty-five
0
public offerings.12
On the question of what news public investors are owed during
merger negotiations, the Supreme Court has eschewed a bright line test
in favor of an analysis that mirrors considerations of whether the news
was material.1 21 Separately, the section of the Securities Exchange Act
governing proxy preparation defines "non-public, confidential
information" as that information not required to be publicly disclosed by
publicly held corporations pursuant to SEC disclosure laws. 122 Further,
the Supreme Court has held that securities analysts are seen as efficient
when piecing together public information into a non-public
conclusion, 123 a curious (albeit quixotic) dictate that is cited to this day.
In the context of improper securities trading, TGS, long ago,
arguably succeeded in only opening a debate that now often confuses
material (as in the definition of insider trading) with materiality (as in
the attendant pleading requirement). It hardly bears noting that any
approach depending upon information to be non-public in order to be
material could equally be said to require that conclusions as to
confidentiality hinge upon findings of market import. Concurrently,
while volumes have since been written on the difficult question of what
is material information, 124 relatively scant is the scrutiny of the
reluctance of the regulators to define the adjoining term, non-public.
Such a career path for the latter half of the definition seems peculiar,
of non-public information has paved
especially when even the promise
25
the way for private lawsuits. 1

120. Id. at 125.
121. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232-41 (1988).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2000).
123. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980).
124. See, e.g., ARTHUR LEVITT WITH PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: HOW TO FIGHT
FOR YOUR FINANCIAL FUTURE 95-97 (2003) (describing the difficulties posed by the inclusion of
the term material from the perspective of an insider trading prohibition of selective disclosure by
issuers to analysts); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[M]ateriality has
become one of the most unpredictable and elusive concepts of the federal securities laws.").
125. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 303 (1985)
(involving a private action under Rule lOb-5 premised upon the misrepresentation of agents of the
defendant and an issuer that inside information was being imparted).
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Angles of the SEC and Others

Attempts at clarification of the term non-public have come in
installments, and unfulfilling ones at that. 26 SEC Rule 14e-3, the more
focused parallel to Rule 1Ob-5 that covers only the situation of tender
offers, is conspicuously silent and its related interpretive materials
provide only a short list of examples (i.e., the intention to make a tender
offer, the withdrawal of a tender offer, and the decision to increase the
amount of the tender offer). 27 In cases charging both rules against
parties trading on news of a merger, the SEC has relied heavily on
written policies protecting corporate confidences at either of the
28
companies involved.

Other laws and regulations have not fared much better at
crystallizing the phrase non-public. Before it was amended, a regulation
adopted pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act 129 added the wrinkle
that non-public information is that which has not been made available
"through recognized channels of distribution.' 130 Abroad, the nearly
two-decade-old European Community Directive on insider dealing
mainly emphasized the material nature of the information.' In 2000,
the SEC's adoption of Regulation FD avoided altogether defining nonpublic. 32 The rule manual for the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD"), while defining "material news," does not attempt

126. See In re Investor's Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 639-46 (1971).
127. See Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6239, Exchange Act Release No. 17,120,
Investment Company Act Release No. 11,336, 20 SEC Docket 1241, 1249-50 (Sept. 4, 1980).
128. See, e.g., Lohman, Initial Decision Release No. 214, 78 SEC Docket 1327, 1328-32 (Sept.
19, 2002) (describing one issuer's policy advising employees that "[i]nformation should not be
considered to have been publicly disclosed until a reasonable time after it has been made public (for
example, by a press release)").
129. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (2000).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(a)(4) (1988). The regulation has been amended to an equally amorphous
definition: "information which has not been disseminated in a manner which makes it generally
available to the trading public." 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(a)(6) (2006).
131. The 1989 measure included the following definition of inside information:
Information which has not been made public of a precise nature relating to one or several
issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it
were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the
transferable security or securities in question.
Council Directive 89/592, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, art. 1, 1989 O.J. (L 334)
30, 31 (EC); see also Lynda M. Ruiz, Note, European Community Directive on InsiderDealing: A
Model for Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in InternationalSecurities
Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 236-37 (1995).
132. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2006).
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written guidance for either public or non-public;' 33 the NYSE rulebook
is similarly silent on both.
The SEC has never prohibited the disclosure of all internal
corporate information, acknowledging that management may reveal nonpublic information that merely fills "interstices in analysis ... [or tests]
the meaning of public information." 134 In 1973, the SEC formally
announced its refined "public access" definition of non-public
information in In re Faberge,Inc., in which the Commission stated that
in order "to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public
generally and without favoring any special person or group,"
information must be disclosed "in a manner calculated to reach the
securities market place in general through recognized channels of
distribution, and public investors must be afforded a reasonable waiting
period to react to the information."'' 35 The stock exchanges have
elaborated on the methodology for the benefit of companies that list their
stock issues with them; these guidelines tend to simultaneously overrequire dissemination and over-emphasize a concrete list of information
vendors who are sure to fall in and out of fashion. 136 A wholly different
approach has been expounded by certain courts, which instead
emphasize the market's impoundment of the material information as
evidenced by a new price.' 37 Such an approach, if lacking in
considerations of general access, at least boasts a lack of tangible
investor harm.

133. "Material news" is defined in the NASD Glossary as news "that might reasonably be
expected to affect the value of a company's securities or influence investors' decisions." NASD,
Glossary of Terms-M, http://www.nasd.com/Resources/Glossary/NASDW_01 1116 (last visited
Mar. 10, 2007).
134. In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971).
135. In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 255, 256 (1973). The Commission had previously
espoused a similar position two years earlier in its review of an internal examiner's findings
concerning the actions of an investment adviser. See Investors Mgmt., 44 S.E.C. at 644.
136.

See RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER

TRADING AND THE WALL § 2.01 [1 ], at 2-6 to -7 (2006) (asserting that the American Stock Exchange
requires listed companies wishing to make information "public" to "notify the exchange, the
national business and financial newswire services, the national general newswire services, The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Moody's Investors Services, and Standard & Poor's
Corporation") (citing AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE LLC, AMEX COMPANY GUIDE § 401(b)
=
(2007)), available at http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEXtools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode
chp_ 1_1_4&manual=/AMEX/CompanyGuide/amex-company-guide/.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993).
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To Know What Mayhew Knew

A series of takeover cases decided by the Second Circuit in the
mid-1990s embraced and then let go of definitions of non-public
information for purposes of finding insider trading. In United States v.
Libera, that Circuit affirmed the "market impoundment" approach by
holding that information becomes public once, even if known only by a
small group of persons, trading "has caused the information to be fully
impounded into the price of the particular stock.' ' 138 In that popular case,
the court upheld the criminal convictions of an outsider who had earned
approximately $95,000 from tips gleaned through copies of Business
Week obtained for $30 each approximately eight hours before the famed
magazine hit the newsstand. 3 9
Later, in United States v. Mylett, the Second Circuit elaborated,
holding that information could be non-public even though it failed to
reveal all the details of a tender offer. 140 In a case centering on a single
trading day, the court noted that The Wall Street Journalhad speculated
about an AT&T acquisition, a possibility that was privately confirmed to
a stockbroker upon a telephone call in which a company vice president
stated: "'AT&T was going to attempt to acquire NCR."",14 1 In upholding
convictions brought under 1Ob-5, the court added to the mix by holding:
"To constitute non-public information under the [Securities Exchange
Act], information
must be specific and more private than general
14 2
rumor."

Finally, in SEC v. Mayhew, the court was called upon to weigh the
informational advantage of Jonathan Mayhew, a private trader
specializing in takeover candidates. 143 Mayhew had obtained
information from a neighbor that went beyond news in the press
concerning the year-long efforts of Rorer Group, Inc. to finalize a
merger. After learning on November 15, 1989 that Rorer was actively
pursuing a merger partner, Mayhew reinvested in Rorer stock, ultimately
yielding a profit exceeding $250,000 when news of a contemplated
tender offer broke in January 1990.144
138. Id. at 601 ("Once the information is fully impounded in price, such information can no
longer be misused by trading because no further profit can be made.").
139. Id. at 598-99.
140. 97 F.3d 663, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1996).
141. Id. at 666.
142. Id.
143. 121 F.3d44(2dCir. 1997).
144. Id. at 49.
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The Mayhew bench discounted Mayhew's prior unprofitable trades
in Rorer during the relevant time period as well as the fact that the
company had been publicized as a takeover candidate. More
importantly, in finding Mayhew liable for violations of Rule 14e-3,145
the Second Circuit adopted the expanded notion that non-public
information could include information transforming the "total mix" of
investor knowledge from the "likely" to the "probable" when it stated:
In sum, the aggregate of public information prior to November 15,
1989, was to the effect that Rorer was willing to merge if it found the
right partner and that Rorer was discussing this possibility with up to
three companies. Privately, Rorer executives took care to keep
information about actual merger discussions secret by limiting the
persons who knew about specific merger negotiations to top executives
and by using codes in related documents.
We agree with the district court that the information Piccolino
conveyed to Mayhew went beyond that which had been publicly
disseminated. Mayhew learned from Piccolino that [the president of
Rorer's pharmaceuticals business] had confirmed that Rorer was
"actually in discussions" toward merger with a candidate or
candidates. He also learned that these merger talks were at a "serious"
stage-far enough along to warrant [Mayhew's company's]
involvement in negotiating a new employment agreement for Rorer's
CEO. To a reasonable investor, this combination of new information,
acquired privately, transformed the likelihood of a Rorer merger from
at some future time to one that was
one that was certainly possible
146
highly probable quite soon.
One might have expected such a ruling if a bright line had been
crossed, but Mayhew never actually learned that a merger had been
finalized, just that the two companies were in some pronounced state of
negotiation termed "in discussions" by industry experts. He was thus

penalized for knowledge beyond that proscribed by the SEC in its
adoption of Rule 14e-3 and that was quite possibly only of value to those
already closely following the market for Rorer stock. A requirement to
abstain from the market in such circumstances seems draconian,
particularly since the Second Circuit had years earlier found no
affirmative duty on market participants "to verify whether or not their

145. The district court found no violations of Rule 1Ob-5 by Mayhew, so the appellate court
did not consider that Rule. See id.
146. Id.at5O-51.
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[trading] information could be deemed public information.' 47 Once
again, observers must wonder how much the defendant's sizeable profit
weighed in the court's analysis.
More importantly, Mayhew and Faberge/Investors Management
indicate two distinct approaches, either: 1) news is public once broadly
disseminated, or 2) news is public once impounded in the price of the
subject stock. Absent clear enunciation of the import of "market
chatter," some courts have quite understandably proven gun-shy about
supporting the Program: In a Ninth Circuit case from the year after
Mayhew was decided, the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants against the Commission's charges of insider trading, which,
based primarily on "massive and well-timed trading" and generic,
' 48
incriminating statements, were characterized as "pure speculation."'
Several years later a federal judge sitting in the Southern District of New
York granted summary judgment for the defendants from what the SEC
alleged was an "insider trading ring operating out of Mexico City. ' 149 In
a case involving the tender offer for CompUSA, the judge clearly
signaled his disdain for the SEC's speculation, stating:
In this case, the SEC concedes that it has not uncovered direct
evidence of the existence of "inside information," relying instead on
the circumstances, the timing, and the nature of the relationships. Prior
to the tender offer announced on January 24, 2000, the market had
started to move, with trading increasing 110% on January 19 over the
previous day's volume and more than doubling over the next two days.
Whether this movement resulted from inside information, market
perception, or shrewd judgment was the issue presented to the SEC.
Certainly the circumstantial evidence warranted the investigation. Only
after full discovery could A.Duclaud's knowledge, or lack of it, be
determined. However, here there is direct evidence that the "inside
information," the making of the tender offer, could not have been
known at the time of the attacked purchases as it did not, as a matter of
uncontroverted fact, exist at that150time. Under such circumstances,
summary judgment is appropriate.

147. SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979) (reversing guilty findings under
Rule I0b-5).
148. SEC v. Goldinger, No. 95-56092, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 730, at *7, *9 (9th Cir. filed
Jan. 14, 1997).
149. SEC v. Gonzalez de Castilla, 184 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
150. Id. at 376-77.
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Thus, even after criminal convictions, judicial scrutiny, and
corresponding publicity, the questions persist: How does one know
when she has received inside information? And when will it become
public? The answers consistently fall back onto the "material, nonpublic" language of the early insider trading cases, which fails as a
yardstick and suffers from four notable setbacks: The standard is too
intertwined, too conclusory, too undefined, and too costly.
1. Too Intertwined
The same TGS case that federalized the crime of insider trading and
contributed so much in clarifying the material part of its definition may
have hopelessly confused the debate over the term non-public. Indeed,
the case at best triggered an analysis weighing events both before and
after disclosure and at worst confused the two concepts entirely with
statements such as this:
Our survey of the facts found below conclusively establishes that
knowledge of the results of the discovery hole.., would have been
important15to a reasonable investor and might have affected the price of
the stock. 1
Indeed, the Program's own emphasis on circumstantial evidence to
prove insider trading has led to a bounty of misappropriation cases in
which market moves favorable to the defendant after the trade are
utilized as primary evidence of the illegality of the transaction. This goes
as far back as 1984, when the Second Circuit held, in a case involving
two bond traders given tips by a law firm manager, that prior successful
stock tips supported the inference that a defendant "either knew or
should have known that he was trading on improperly obtained nonpublic information."' 5 2 Likewise, as recently as 2002, in a case involving
a tipping investment banker, the Southern District held that a
"substantial increase in the stock price upon the public announcement of
the merger" supported a finding that the transaction was material.5 3 Not
surprisingly, at least one court has followed the TGS lead to its logical

151. SEC v. TGS, 401 F.2d 833, 850 (2d Cir. 1968); see also Rubin, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,769, at 97,713 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1993) (stating that information is
material where it turns the "rumor into a sure thing").
152. SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425,442 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
153. Sekhri, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,963, at 90,581 (S.D.N.Y.
July 22, 2002).
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conclusion
by dismissing a claim of materiality where no market decline
15 4
ensued.
2. Too Conclusory
Apart from definitional inter-reliance, and the result of avoiding
any bright line test, the court's findings of the presence of non-public
information are at times derived from determinations of whether
separate indicia of a crime are present. Roughly stated, holdings more
often than not brand news non-public if, in hindsight, someone thought it
was worth stealing.
This circuitous reasoning inevitably prompts courts into a case-bycase factoring of all events attending suspect trading or noteworthy
profits. The phenomenon is perhaps best exemplified by the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in SEC v. Ginsburg,'55 in which a CEO of a company
that owned radio stations was accused of tipping his family members to
impending mergers. In overturning the district court's verdict for the
defendant based upon a finding that "[e]vidence that... [he] could have
communicated inside information to [his brother] is not evidence that he
did communicate inside information,"' 156 the appellate court concluded:
The temporal proximity of a phone conversation between the trader
and one with insider knowledge provides a reasonable basis for
inferring that the basis of the trader's belief [that the price would
increase] was the inside information. The larger and more profitable
the trades, and the closer in time the trader's exposure to the insider,
the stronger the inference
that the trader was acting on the basis of
157
inside information.
As further example of this hindsight approach, a much publicized
2002 SEC case against an investment banker and his "tippees" went so
far as to cite two defendants' transferring money out of the country and
"abrupt departure from the United States to avoid prosecution"
as two
58
facts helping to establish lOb-5 liability in an SEC civil action.'

154. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997).
155. 362 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2004).
156. SEC v. Ginsburg, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
157. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d at 1299.
158. Sekhri, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,576-77. That decision also
premised the finding of the defendants' "knowledge or reckless disregard of the fact that they were
trading on confidential information" on their prior knowledge that their source "worked in the
corporate finance department at Salomon [Brothers] and was in a position likely to have access to
confidential information." Id. at 90,580.
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3. Too Undefined (The Lost Martha Stewart Opportunity)
While the much-publicized case against Martha Stewart proved to
be a media delight,15 9 it should perhaps be remembered for what it did
not provide lawyers, judges, compliance officers, and academics: The
answer to the question of whether news of the trading efforts of another
160
customer is inside information under the law. To wit, in June 2003,
the SEC brought civil charges against Stewart and her stockbroker,
alleging that the passing of a tip that the head of ImClone was selling his
161 Specifically,
company shares was "material, nonpublic information."
the Commission charged that Martha Stewart's broker had instructed her
that ImClone's CEO and his daughter "were selling or attempting to sell
all of their ImClone shares at Merrill Lynch and that [the broker]
162
on that information.''
believed that Stewart might wish to act
Additionally, the Commission's complaint relied heavily on Merrill
which banned the disclosure of one
Lynch's internal procedures,
163
customer's order to another.
Notably, when the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York brought its criminal case, the office apparently found the theory
shaky, for the parallel criminal indictment, while boasting a robust total
of nine charges (including obstructions of justice and securities fraud),
did not include insider trading. The press was quick to pick up on the
irony of a prosecution premised on purported lies centering on trading
164
activity that may not have been criminal at all. Indeed, many articles
aptly noted the questions not resolved by the Stewart matter, as well as
1 65
the Rule lOb-5 elements left unaddressed. Counsel for a leading white
collar law firm in Washington, D.C. went so far as to state that the news
of sales by a company insider in question might not even be illegal if the
159. See John Lehmann et al., Martha 's Goose Getting Cooked-Her Recipe for Disaster
Began with a Tip: Feds, N.Y. POST, Oct. 3, 2002, at 9.

160. The SEC charges relied upon Merrill Lynch's confidentiality policy to prove the illegality
at
of the disclosure of Sam Waksal's trading by Stewart's broker, Peter Bacanovic. See Complaint
the
of
account
compelling
a
For
2003).
4,
June
(S.D.N.Y.
1, 7-9, SEC v. Stewart, No. 03 CV 4070
C.
breadth of questions that might have been answered by a Martha Stewart trial, see Donald
that
Stewart
Martha
Against
Case
Fraud
Securities
the
(And
Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter
Never Happened), 10 LEWIS& CLARK L. REV. 1 (2006).
161. Complaint, supra note 160, at 1.
162. Id. at 10.
163. Id. at 7-9.
BOSTON GLOBE,
164. See Naomi Aoki & Tatsha Robertson, Stewart Is Indicted, Steps Down,

June 5, 2003, at AI ("Charges of insider trading were notably absent from the criminal case.").
a
165. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 160, at 11 ("Much of the discussion [about
of
use
particular
the
to
respect
with
been
has
trading]
insider
for
Stewart
Martha
hypothetical trial of
the misappropriation theory of liability that would be necessary to create liability.").
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underlying news had already been the subject of Internet chatter. 166
Moreover, the public debate on what did and did not need to be proven
at a hypothetical insider trading trial approached the sublime. 167
The SEC's case against Stewart was stayed pending her criminal
trial and later settled. 68 Among the many peculiarities occasioned by
that non-trial, investors and other market watchers were denied
edification as to whether the news of another customer's order is per se
non-public. It seems safe to conclude that, given the shakiness of the
misappropriation theory and the recent, unpredictable outcomes of cases
relying thereon, the Program could have used any guidance the court
would have had to offer.
4. Too Costly (The Next Great Setback?)
The government's universal application of its Supreme Courtapproved misappropriation theory to outsiders generating considerable
profits from advance knowledge has resulted in mixed results. 169 Indeed,
a rash of cases from 2006 further highlights the flaws of any conclusory
approach to the difficult questions surrounding insider trading charges.
In the late summer of 2006, two separate juries acquitted
defendants accused of using their position as specialists on the floor of
166. See Randi F. Marshall, Martha'sCase Not Necessarily All Sewn Up, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9.
2002, at A44 (interviewing Jacob Frenkel, counsel with Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP).
167. For example, a CNN interview transcript of an August 2002 segment describing the
Martha Stewart case memorializes the following tautological exchange on "inside information"
between television hosts Bruce Francis and Kathleen Hays, and a former U.S. Attorney, Zachary
Carter:
Host:[Ilf it's just a rumor ... and you don't know it's true, you didn't get it directly from
the source, how does that affect whether or not this is illegal?
FormerUSA: Well, whether it's material or not wouldHost: If it's definitely materialFormer USA: Well, it wouldn't necessarily be material if it were an unverified rumor.
Then, the question becomes whether or not it is really a nonpublic material fact that the
company knows or the company insiders know and that others don't[,] particularly the
investing public.
Money & Markets: Twist & Turns of Waksal Woes (CNN television broadcast Aug. 12, 2002).
168. See Press Release, SEC, Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic Settle SEC's Insider
Trading Charges (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-134.htm. Stewart
consented to a penalty of three times the loss she allegedly avoided ($195,000) and a five-year bar
from serving as a director of a public company. Id.
169. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272-74 (1 th Cir. 2003) (finding that husband and
wife possessed the requisite fiduciary relationship for 1Ob-5(l) liability for purposes of applying the
misappropriation theory); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(finding the actions of a CEO and member of a young president's club to possibly "warrant
expulsion from the club," but not to "fall within the criminal laws of the United States").
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the NYSE1 70 to "front run" customer orders that were but minutes old-a
form of insider trading based upon market information-as well as
intervening in trades, as opposed to matching buyer and seller (a practice
7
coined "interpositioning" by the regulators).' ' Shortly thereafter, a
federal judge dismissed Commission allegations that the president of a
Milwaukee investment company had sold shares and "tipped" clients
after learning from board meetings of liquidity and pricing problems,
stating that "the SEC has not proffered any evidence to demonstrate a
172
genuine issue" that would entitle it to a trial. Moreover, in October
2006, in a case where the jury agreed that the trader interpositioned in
violation of Rule 1Ob-5, the judge nonetheless publicly commented that,
although he was not willing to overturn the jury verdict, there was "some
173
Approximately
fuzziness in the law" advanced by the prosecutors.
four months later, the judge followed his instincts and formally
overruled the jury, deciding that the government had failed to establish a
Rule 1Ob-5 violation-even in the presence of interpositioning in
violation of NYSE rules-by neglecting to prove that the defendant had
misled or deceived customers. Noteworthy is that the judge undercut the
government's emphasis upon sizeable profits by reminding that
"historically specialists have made a profit in the overwhelming majority
of their proprietary trades" and concluding that a showing that the
defendant "was good at what he did and was well compensated for his

170. A specialist is a "member of a stock exchange who maintains a fair and orderly market in
one or more securities," performing "two main functions: executing limit orders on behalf of other
exchange members for a portion of the floor broker's commission, and buying or sellingsometimes selling short-for the specialist's own account to counteract temporary imbalances in
supply and demand and thus prevent wide swings in stock prices." DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra
note 14, at 661.
171. Chad Bray, Volpe Is Acquitted in NYSE Case, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at C3 (noting
also that a month earlier a separate jury acquitted another specialist from the same firm of securities
fraud charges for the same behavior). Both Volpe and his former co-Specialist had been charged
with violations of SEC Rules 1Ob-5 and I lb-I based upon their "using knowledge of a trade to deal
in front of it" and "interpositioning." Jenny Anderson et al., 15 Specialists from Big Board Are
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at CI; see also Chad Bray, Ex-Van der Mooler Specialist
2006
/
1, 2006, http://www.boston.com/business/articles/
Acquitted, BOSTON.COM, Aug.
08/01/ex_van dermoolenspecialist.acquitted/.
172. SEC v. Heartland Advisors, Inc., No. 03-C-1427, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62450, at *18
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2006).
173. Paul Davies & Aaron Lucchetti, Ex-trader Found Guilty, But Judge Questions Case,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at C3 (reporting on Judge Chin's comments in deciding motion to
dismiss in United States v. Finnerty, Nos. 05-CR-393, 05-CR-397, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72119, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:539

efforts was
hardly compelling evidence the he engaged in securities
, 174
fraud."

Perhaps the realm of class action litigation will be the area where
the underpinnings of the Program suffers their next Dirks or Chiarella.
Conspicuously tied to 10b-5 precedent, but unfettered by criminal case
standards, private actions choosing to reinterpret or attenuate the insider
trading definition or attendant elements appear eager to kick
questionable cases out of the courts. In August 2006, a district court in
Arizona dismissed insider trading claims against two company directors
who allegedly sold their shares in advance of disclosure of a substantial
net loss for the quarter ending December 2004.175 The suit brought by
shareholders was held to fatally not "indicate how or in what form the
'non-public information regarding the improper accounting' was
disclosed" to the defendants. 176 The district court judge reiterated:
"Plaintiffs have failed to plead particular facts that show that [the
defendants] face a 'substantial likelihood' of liability for insider
trading.' ' 177 Three weeks later, the Southern District of New York
dismissed a shareholder complaint in its entirety because the plaintiffs
had failed to allege any facts supporting the inference that outside
directors who sold their shares had possessed (either constructively or
otherwise) any "adverse nonpublic information" concerning the
78
company's products. 1
Of greater moment is the highly publicized criminal case pending
against Joseph Nacchio, CEO of Qwest Communications International,
Inc. 179 Nacchio was indicted in 2005 and charged with forty-two counts
of insider trading based upon his sales of approximately $101 million in
company stock in 2001.180 Legal experts have characterized the
government's case as overreaching for nondisclosure of information

174. United States v. Finnerty, No. 05 Cr. 393, slip op. at 30-31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2007).
Although the Finnerty case is not labeled an insider trading case, Judge Chin relied heavily on
insider trading precedent, and footnote 3 of the decision reminds that the government originally
charged the defendant with "trading ahead," a specialized form of insider trading routinely applied
to market professionals. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading
Ring (Mar. 1, 2007), http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-28.htm.
175. In reVistacare, Inc., No. CIV 04-1739, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62021, at *28-29 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 29, 2006).
176. Id. at *24 (quoting the allegation made in the shareholders' complaint).
177. Id. at *25.
178. In re Forest Labs., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 379, 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
179. Indictment at 1,United States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545 (D. Colo. Dec. 20, 2005).
180. See id. at *1-5.
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In a
regarding a public company's eventual accounting failures.'
lengthy battle that may ultimately turn on the defendant's belief in his
company's prospects for an economic turnaround, the judge has been
quoted as stating during a March 2006 evidentiary hearing that the
' 182 Further, in his
government had not brought a "model indictment.'
August 2006 procedural ruling, the judge granted the defendant's motion
to compel the government to provide additional details 183on alleged
Nacchio's sales.
material, non-public information prompting
Obviously, cases are dismissed everyday, and courtroom losses are
bound to occur. But what is troubling is the willingness of juries to
exonerate "insiders," such as specialists, and the concurrent eagerness of
jurists to speak out on the inappropriateness of the charges. To be sure,
just hoping that judges and juries will, at best, fill in the details and, at
worst, know insider trading when they see it, is not an effective SEC
strategy for the new millennium. Moreover, any recent stumbles aside,
lawyer and layman 184 alike have long remained unconvinced of the
185
efficacy of the agency's efforts. This raises the question: Why wait
any longer to heed the calls for clarity that have been sounding for over
thirty years?

Dec. 21,
181. See Christopher Palmeri, The Case Against Qwest's Nacchio, Bus. WK.2ONLINE,
20 0
00
512215/tc
available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec
2005,
927069.htm?chan=search.
DENV. Bus. J., Mar. 24,
182. See, e.g., Bob Mook, Judge Refuses to Dismiss Nacchio Case,
r m- r =
6
(online
2006, http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2006/03/20/daily5 .html?f o ss l
Dionne Searcey &
See
2007.
19,
March
on
"Latest News" update). The Nacchio trial commenced
Peter Lattman, Ex-Telecom CEO Fields 'Back Box' Trial Defense, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2007, at
Al.
183. United States v. Nacchio, No. 05-cr-00545, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 60623, at *24 (D.
Colo. Aug. 25, 2006). On April 20, 2007, Nacchio was found guilty of nineteen counts of insider
trading, and found not guilty of twenty-three other counts. See Dionne Searcey et al., Qwest's
Nacchio Is Found Guilty in Trading Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2007, at Al. The split verdict came
after jurors had asked the judge during the six day deliberations for a "precise definition" of
"material information." Andy Vuong, Joe Nacchio on Trial, Jurors Ask for Clarification, DENV.
POST, Apr. 18, 2007, at C-01. After the verdict against the infamous telecommunications CEO, the
U.S. Attorney for Colorado was quoted as saying, "For anyone who has ever made a call in Qwest
territory, the term 'convicted felon Joe Nacchio' has a nice ring to it." Searcey et al., supra.
184. See Gretchen Morgenson, Whispers of Mergers Set off Bouts of Suspicious Trading, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at Al. Morgenson cited the latest results of an analytical research firm that
studied the trading in subject stocks prior to a merger in the preceding twelve months. The study
concluded that of ninety sizeable mergers during the study period, thirty-seven "target companies
exhibited abnormal trading in the days and weeks before the deals were disclosed" and that "in a
handful of the mergers, significant progress toward a deal was being made on the days unusual
trading occurred." Id. The SEC was reported to have had no comment on the study. Id.
185. See id.
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C. Listening to the Same Soundtrack?
Overall, the varied SEC and court approaches to non-public
information have created a dissonance; that dissonance swells to a
cacophony when one considers the veritable panoply of industry
regulators and forums that must enforce insider trading prohibitions. To
wit, as the result of conflicting interpretations of both Rule 1Ob-5 and
Rule 14e-3, different sectors and regulators of the market have
announced different rules for pursuit of trading information.1 86 A
brokerage firm research report is thought to become public twenty-four
hours after its release, 8 7 while an independent magazine article is
presumed absorbed when it hits the newsstand. 188 News on the NYSE
Floor is thought to be absorbed by the world in ninety seconds, 89 and
customer trades are thought to become public either once effected' 90 or
reported.' 9' But a significant customer order may demand brokerage
firm inaction, even fourteen hours after it hits the queue. 192 In the area of
186. For example, the regulatory arms of the various stock exchanges play a key role in both
enforcing and shaping the nation's securities laws. See, e.g., David P. Doherty et al., The
Enforcement Role of the New York Stock Exchange, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 637 (1991) (delineating the
NYSE's enforcement, investigation, and disciplinary functions and how these functions
substantively shape its polices).
187. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 99-67, at 3 (June 17, 1999),
availableat http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/99-067.pdf("[T]he Firm had in place a written policy which
prohibited employee and employee-related accounts from trading in securities which were the
subject of Firm research ('Restricted Securities') for a 24-hour period (the 'Restricted Period')
following the release of a recommendation or change in recommendation.").
188. See NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 94-9, at 19 (Jan. 26, 1994), available
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/94-009.pdf (involving a broker charged with trading on material
information that he knew or was reckless in not knowing was non-public where he effected
"purchases on Thursdays before the 5:00 p.m. official release time of the issue of the
[magazine in
question]").
189. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51,524, 85 SEC Docket 517, 520
(Apr. 12, 2005) (noting that up until 1999, in monitoring trading by specialists for their own
accounts, NYSE surveillance systems only noted trades ahead of customer orders that had been
posted to the primary order processing system for ninety seconds).
190. See NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-172, at 2, 5-6 (Nov. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-172.pdf (finding a Rule IOb-5 violation where a "Floor
Clerk" caused a trade to be executed at 10:06 a.m. while aware of a customer order that was not
executed until 10:15 a.m.); see also SEC v. TGS, 401 F.2d 833, 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding
that certain defendants must have known that their trades effected at the market opening would not
be immediately appreciated by the market).
191. See Gretchen Morgenson, A Big Nasdaq Penalty in an Old Bugaboo: Delayed Trade
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1998, at D8 ("N.A.S.D. rules require that every transaction, and the
price at which it changes hands, be made public within 90 seconds of execution so that all investors
have equal access to information.").
192. See NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 98-69, at 3 (July 16, 1998), available
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/98-069.pdf.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/5

36

Colesanti: "We'll Know It When We Can't Hear It": A Call for a Non-Pornograp
2006]

APPROACH TO RECOGNIZING NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION

communications with analysts, some issuers have simply stopped talking
altogether.1 93 Further, in the absence of any clear law, brokerage firms
1 94
internal standards.
are still faulted for failing only to enforce their own
The practical effect is arguably a lack of deterrence, as industry
participants at many levels of the market game attempt to divine the
proper standard for abstinence.1 95
In sum, while Justice Stewart's practical pornography test approach
96
was born from his experiences confronting exotic literature,1 not many
judges and jurists will have had prior, relevant experience when it comes
to defining insider trading. And despite the continued prioritizing of
insider trading offenses by the SEC and concerted efforts by varied
marketplace strata to discern its rules, again, the two main questions
persist: 1) When does someone know if they have received non-public
information?, and 2) How long until it is public?
IV.

AN OBJECTIVELY VISIBLE SOLUTION

Congressional action, judicial interpretation, untold pleadings, and
SEC rulemaking have not cleared up the evasiveness of the insider
trading prohibition, or the obtuseness of its arguably most identifying
component-the term non-public. Even those trying in good faith to
comport with the Commission's expectations are going to be left
wondering when information has been adequately disseminated. While
the crime remains a priority, surely some action regarding the applicable

193. Within a week of the SEC's adoption of Regulation FD-which outlawed "selective
disclosure" by an issuer of material information-the California law firm that was serving as
counsel to Cisco Systems, Inc. and E* Trade Group, Inc. stated that it planned to advise clients "that
if it isn't too detrimental to relations with analysts and others, forgoing such conversations 'is the
safest thing to do."' Jeff D. Opdyke & Aaron Lucchetti, Mum's the Word in Wake of Disclosure
Rule, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2000, at CI.
194. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-30, at 1, 8 (Mar. 8, 2004)
(explaining that a firm consented to the disciplinary penalty of a censure and a $625,000 fine
because it "failed to have or implement specific procedures to prevent a violation of the policies"
prohibiting disclosure).
195. But see MALKIEL, supranote 112, at 210 ("[T]ightened rules on disclosure make time lags
in the dissemination of new information much shorter than they may have been in previous years.").
196. Authors Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong provide the foundation for Stewart's
obscenity test:
He had seen it during World War II, when he served as a Navy lieutenant. In Casablanca,
as watch officer for his ship, he had seen his men bring back locally produced
pornography. He knew the difference between the hardest of hard core and much of what
came to the [Supreme] Court. He called it his "Casablanca Test."
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 2, at 194.
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law should be taken. In the spirit of insider trading's two-part definition,
a two-part solution is hereby offered.
A.

For the "Insider"

The regulatory cause would perhaps best be served by drawing
guidance from the latest trend of the industry's primary regulators, the
stock exchanges. Functioning as self-regulatory organizations ("SROs")
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,197 exchanges such as the
NASD and NYSE are the day-to-day regulators of the marketplace.
These SROs have the expertise, personnel, and experience, as well as a
track record of bringing thousands of disciplinary actions against
industry professionals to date.1 98 And these SROs have been shying
away from any inclusion of the term material in the notion of inside
information, the result being that all confidential corporate information
is thought to be suspect, and all premature trading based thereon thought
to be illegal. 199
For example, witness the blanket prohibition of the NYSE's "Code
of Business Conduct and Ethics" for its directors. Adopted after the
NYSE's much publicized internal conflicts and its agents' ethical lapses
in recent years (e.g., floor trading sanctions, the resignation of its highly
compensated CEO, and the indictment of NYSE board member Martha
Stewart), the code addresses the nagging questions concerning the
contours of insider trading as follows:

197. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ee) (2006).
198. See A Review of the GAO Report on the Sale of FinancialProducts to Military Personnel:
Hearing On Military Sales Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 151 st
Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Vice-Chairman and President, Regulatory Policy and
Oversight), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ files/ACFA5E2.pdf (testifying to 1410 NASD
enforcement actions in 2004, resulting in the barring or suspension of 830 individuals). In
November 2006 and January 2007, respectively, the Boards of the NYSE and NASD formally
approved the proposal that will merge most of their regulatory efforts into a new SRO by the end of
the second quarter of 2007. See Press Release, NYSE, NASD and NYSE Group Announce Plan to
Consolidate
Regulation
of Securities Finns (Nov.
28,
2006), http://www.nyse.
com/press/l164625606086.html; Press Release, NASD, NASD Member Firms Embrace
Streamlined, More Efficient Regulation (Jan. 21, 2007), http://www.nasd.com/Press
Room/NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/NASDW_018334.
199. See, e.g., Press Release, NASD, NASD Charges Two Minneapolis Brokers with Insider
Trading; Settles with Three Others (Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.nasd.com/PressRooni/
NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/NASDW_002891 (describing charges against two brokers for
trading in a public stock "while in possession of inside information about the company's reverse
merger").
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All non-public information about the NYSE or its member firms or
listed companies should be considered confidential information. To use
non-public information for personal financial benefit or to "tip" others
the basis of this
who might make an investment decision on
200
information is not only unethical but also illegal.
Accordingly, traditional corporate insiders (as defined by section
16(b)-officers, directors and ten-percent shareholders) should be
advised through internal company policies that all confidential
information is material. Such a construct eliminates the "before and
after" analysis that gauges price drops and surges. Board members,
analysts, specialists and other exchange floor personnel are, by nature of
their position, given priority in the aquarium of market life; the cost for
that privileged position will be a presumption that the prettiest flora will
be subject to an "abstain or disclose" rule.
Outsiders in attendance at board meetings, or other informationsensitive events and locales, could simply be made to sign
confidentiality agreements that bring them within the purview of law
covering insiders, recourse that, in actuality, is likely already to exist
given such cases as O'Hagan and Talbot. This isolation should stem the
tide of confidential information while impressing upon its conduits the
seriousness of the wave. Further, by extricating the term material and,
consequently, the efficacy of the trading scheme, from the analysis, the
proposed reform even reaches attempted insider trading, in line with the
bold expansion of enforcement policy quietly undertaken by the
Commission in recent years.2 ° '

200. NYSE, Inc., NYSE Directors' Code of Business Conduct and Ethics 3 (Apr. 1, 2004),
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/codeofethics.pdf. Interestingly, Congress has taken a similar approach
through different semantics, namely, lopping off the material requirement in a pending bill aimed at
information accessible by "Members and employees of Congress." Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge Act, H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
201. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 10, SEC v. Waksal, 02 Civ. 4407 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1I,
2003) ("As part of and in furtherance of this violative conduct, Waksal, in breach of a fiduciary duty
to ImClone's shareholders and while in possession of material non-public information, attempted to
sell 79,797 shares of his ImClone stock on December 27 and 28, 2001."). Waksal, Martha Stewart's
alleged "tipper," ultimately pled guilty to actual and attempted insider trading and was sentenced to
seven years and three months in prison. Constance L. Hays, Former Chief of ImClone Is Given 7Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, June II, 2003, at Cl (reporting that the judge "ordered Dr. Waksal to
spend 87 months in prison").
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B. For the Non-insider
As for outsiders, a simple twenty-four-hour clock would uniformly
advise laymen when it is safe to trade, the key consideration in any
insider trading hypothetical. Existing SEC rules already provide specific
20 3
02
guidance on this topic. Although itself limited in design and effect,
Regulation FD, which targets the specific ill of selective disclosure of
inside information by public companies, actually includes arguably the
best insider trading timepiece formulated to date. Specifically, its tiered
approach to remedies distinguishes between conscious and inadvertent
slips of the tongue, and affords corresponding remedial periods ranging
from immediately to twenty-four hours.
Rule 100 of the SEC regulation reads as follows:
General rule regarding selective disclosure.
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses
any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its
securities to any person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section,
the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information as provided
in § 243.101(e):
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure;
and
20 4
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
"Promptly" is defined: "as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no
event after the later of 24 hours or the commencement of the next day's
trading on the New York Stock Exchange)" after an issuer's senior
official "learns that there has been a non-intentional disclosure. 20 5
Elsewhere, the Regulation clarifies the natural divide between
material and non-public by expressly stating requirements in the
conjunctive:

202. Scholars were quick to note that "Regulation FD does not apply when the company is
communicating with the press, ratings agencies, and ordinary-course business communications with

customers and suppliers."

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 557 (rev.

5th ed. 2006).
203. To be sure, Regulation FD, as an insider trading prohibition, has had an inauspicious start.
In one of the first cases brought against an issuer by the SEC's Division of Enforcement, a federal
judge dealt the regulation a harsh blow by exonerating company management on grounds that the
information allegedly disclosed selectively by management was neither material nor non-public.
SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2006).
205. Id. § 243.101(d).
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A selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is
"intentional" when the person making the disclosure either knows, or
he or she is
is reckless in not knowing, that the information
20 6
communicating is both material and nonpublic.
Regulation FD thus exhibits a no tolerance policy for the insiders
and market professionals (who are more likely to comprehend "abstain
or disclose") while incorporating a twenty-four-hour grace period for all
others. By reiterating the above passages through an SEC release, the
solution suggested herein would likewise aptly inform all market
participants of relevant government expectations. As a yardstick, the
measure would succeed on many levels. It would remind issuers and
their management that there is no "gray area" when it comes to tipping
inside information to potential friends of the company; it would also
provide the entire industry with guidance as to the heightened level of
culpability attending the actions taken by those who should know better.
But perhaps first and foremost, concerning all other market participants,
it contributes a time period that is knowable and acceptable: "When in
doubt, wait twenty-four hours before trading."
Such a call for a finite deadline also seems in lockstep with the
instantaneous nature of market news in the age of the Internet, an
investment tool that the Commission now agrees is used by seventy-five
percent of all Americans. 20 7 Simply put, in a world where any outsider
can get real-time news on trades and quotes, clear guidance on windows
of opportunity seem fair. Any investor wondering whether information
that has come into his hands should sleep on it before trading. Such a
"doctor's orders" approach may seem simplistic, but it surpasses the
current state of confusion, where even those trying in good faith to
comport with the SEC guidelines are caught between jumping ahead of
the market and watching it pass by, while those executing the Program,
so often faulted for their zeal, find their efforts doubted for letting too
much "deviant trading" proceed unchecked.20 8
206. Id. § 243.101(a).
207. The Commission has observed:
Internet usage in the United States has grown considerable since 2000 when we
published our most recent interpretive guidance on the use of the electronic media in
securities offerings, including with regard to prospectus delivery by electronic means.
For example, recent data indicates that 75% of Americans have access to the Internet in
their homes, and that those numbers are increasing steadily among all age groups.
Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8501, Exchange Act Release No. 50,624,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,649, 84 SEC Docket 4, 74 n.353 (Feb. 11, 2005).
208. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The SEC's war on insider trading has been a noble one. With scant
congressional support, a diligent agency has expanded a vague but
consistent notion of fairness into a body of case law encapsulated in
some bold victories with far-reaching results. The notion embodies a
persistent mission that has outpaced the goals of most other agencies and
outlasted over four decades of political administrations. But along the
way, judges and juries have questioned the bounds of that notion, and
even cases in accordance with SEC theory concede that not every
unfairness rises to the level of violation.2 °9
Contrary to any excessive criticism, the Commission's insider
trading enforcement program is far from dead, as evidenced by a
continuing parade of settlements and even, on some occasions, the
supportive testimony of learned academics. 210 Noteworthy is that in a
recent six-month period alone the Commission obtained significant
settlement and attendant penalties in Rule 1Ob-5 insider trading cases
brought against a widely varied list of respondents, including a major
securities broker-dealer,2 11 a bank broker selling mutual funds,2t 2 a New
Jersey letter carrier,2 13 a group of ten "day traders, 2 1 4 and an accountant
209. The aforementioned Dirks case, the rationale of which remains the basis for tipper-tippee
liability, stated that "in a statutory area of the law such as securities regulation, where legal
principles of general application must be applied, there may be significant distinctions between
actual legal obligations and ethical ideals." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661 n.21 (1983) (quotation
omitted).
210. See, e.g., Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is There Adequate
Criminal Enforcement?: HearingBefore S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement
of
Jonathan
Macey,
Professor
of
Law,
Yale
University),
available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2405&witid=578 1. Professor Macey testified:
The SEC in its enforcement program does an excellent job of balancing the important
public policy goal of detecting and punishing insider trading with the important public
policy goal of conducting insider trading investigations in a careful and professional
manner so as to not needlessly ruin the professional reputations of innocent people.
Id.
211. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Morgan Stanley with Failure to Maintain and Enforce
Policies
to
Prevent
Misuse
of
Inside
Information
(June
27,
2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-103.htm.
212. Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles Securities Fraud Charges Against Theodore Sihpol (Oct.
12, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-146.htm.
213. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces New Charges Against Insider Trading Ring (May
11, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-70.htm. The international scheme was said to
involve fourteen individuals to whom the letter carrier "illegally leaked secret grand jury
information," information stolen from Merrill Lynch and Business Week magazine. Id.
214. A.B. Watley Group, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19,616, 87 SEC Docket 1829, 1829-30
(Mar. 21, 2006).
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at the company that hired a popular radio personality for satellite
radio. 15 During that same period the Commission also brought or settled
insider trading charges against an executive at a dermatology cream
21 8 a
company,2 16 a financial analyst, 21 7 a company controller,
2 19 a doctor who participated in company drug
Philadelphia lawyer,
trials, 220 and a salesman of implantable human tissue. 22 1 Concurrently,
successful criminal insider cases have been brought in hotly contested
trials, including the Enron litigation.222 Clearly, in cases involving both
civil or criminal charges, insider and outsider alike, the heart of the
Program is still beating. 3
However, the legal underpinnings of the Program have remained
vague for too long, and loud judicial questions hint at its reformation.
224 novel
With the augur of untold new insider trading inquiries,
225 and the burgeoning era of unfathomable
securities fraud cases,
226
now might be the most opportune
penalties for white collar crimes,
215. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Two with Insider Trading in Advance of
Announcement of Howard Stem's Sirius Deal (Dec. 19, 2005), http://sec.gov/news/press/2005178.htm.
216. See David P. Hamilton, Connetics Executive Is Charged with Insider Trading by the SEC,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006, at BI 1.
217. Sibal, Litigation Release No. 19,539, 87 SEC Docket 522, 522-23 (Jan. 23, 2006).
218. Kusatzky, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,531, at 63,218 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2006).
219. Downs, Litigation Release No. 19,698, 88 SEC Docket 137, 137-38 (May 15, 2006).
220. Agarwala, Litigation Release No. 19,568, 87 SEC Docket 1010, 1010 (Feb. 16, 2006).
221. Farley, Litigation Release No. 19,676, 87 SEC Docket 2639, 2639-40 (Apr. 27, 2006).
222. See Press Release, SEC, Statements Concerning Today's Verdict in Criminal Trial in
Houston (May 25, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-8I.htm (referencing the
prosecutor's victory against Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, the latter of whom was found guilty
of one often charged counts of insider trading).
223. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading Ring (Mar.
8
1, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-2 .htm; Press Release, SEC, SEC Enforcement
Failing to Safeguard Nonpublic Research
for
Securities
Action Against Bane of America
Information and Publishing Fraudulent Research; Firm to Pay $26 Million (Mar. 14, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-42.htm.
224. See Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 2006, at A l (reporting the SEC's investigation of possible insider trading based on leaks from a
private conference call between Movie Gallery and its lenders regarding the poor state of the movie
rental industry).
225. See United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53577, at *7-8
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Comverse Technology, Inc.
CEO, CFO, and General Counsel in Stock Option Backdating Scheme (Aug. 9, 2006),
006 2006
-137.htm (discussing allegations that former executives
/
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2
"realized millions of dollars of ill-gotten compensation through the exercise of illegally backdated
option grants and the subsequent sale of Comverse common stock").
226. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson & Brooke A. Masters, Cook the Books, Get Life in Prison: Is
Justice Served?, WASH. POST., Sept. 25, 2006, at Al (protesting that sentences for fraud are parallel
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time to address the shortcomings. Times have changed, and so should
the pivotal portions of the SEC enforcement program.22 7 Thus, with a
sense of urgency the Commission should defer to burgeoning SRO and
market standards, and hold the professionals to a higher standard. The
Second Circuit said decades ago: "Because of their positions, insiders
know when they have the kind of knowledge that is likely to affect the
value of stock. 228 Likewise, the stock exchanges have long recognized
the role of securities professionals of fiduciaries to the market and the
concomitant duty to be "ever vigilant., 229 As for the layman, the
guidance would also be more clear.
This two-prong solution to the problematic two-prong definition
should draw supporters from across the spectrum. It gets at the board
member feigning loyalty, the broker stealing a squawk box transmission,
and the self-feeding exchange specialists, but exonerates the unknowing
"tippees," those buried in the trading curve of merger speculation, and
the celebrity objects of scorn. The SEC's bright new net would still
ensnare those who would trade early on advance copies of Business
Week (for not waiting twenty-four hours) but flow over those who would
follow their broker's advice to sell a stock (who have no idea when the
recommendation was spawned). It heeds the call for written guidance
sounded so elegantly in Bausch & Lomb while continuing to shield the
eavesdropper, sympathetic or not. The reformed program would thus
preserve the worthwhile elements of the Program, while even expanding
it to criminalize attempts at violating Rule 1Ob-5 (a goal often more
worthy than some of the completed schemes that have drawn scrutiny to
to those for "first-degree murder, high-level drug dealing and espionage" and noting the abolition of
parole and lengthening of prison terms for white-collar crimes in recent years).
227. It may already be too late for the Commission to fix its roof before the rain: In October
2006, it was reported that the SEC Division of Enforcement had come under formal scrutiny from
Congress because of allegations of preferential treatment and declining numbers of cases. See Judith
Burns & Kara Scannel, SEC Brings Fewer Enforcement Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at C3
(noting that the number of cases fell ten percent, the third year of decline, and that the Government
Accountability Office had informed Senator Charles Grassley "that it would grant his request and
review the SEC's enforcement and examinations divisions"). Further, in February 2007, an interim
Senate report concluded that in 2005 the Commission "mishandled its inquiry into suspect trades by
a prominent hedge fund [Pequot Capital Management], then may have tried to cover up those
mistakes after its chief investigator on the case complained," prompting former committee chairman
Arlen Specter and Charles Grassley to ask the SEC or the Justice Department to investigate the
hedge fund. Walt Bogdanich, Senate Report Says S.E.C. Botched Hedge Fund Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2007, at C2.
228. SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1979).
229. NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 99-157, at 5 (Dec. 10, 1999), availableat
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/99-157.pdf.
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date). 230 Surely, fairness-that standard that first enlivened the Program
over forty years ago-dictates that all market participants be forewarned.
And by clarifying the prohibitions and the remedies, best of all, judge,
business man, regulator and layman alike will all know the warning
when they see it.
As for the "message cases,,, 23 1 precedent already amply supports
charging those in the vortex of market information, as well as noted
captains of industry, for theft of information under the mail fraud and
wire fraud statutes 232-two prohibitions better suited to capturing those
who deal in contraband. For the prosecutor and the enforcement attorney
233
who would cling to the Program and Rule 1Ob-5 as a weapon,
shunning the insider trading headlines for good old fashioned claims of
theft may be less tantalizing, but then again, non-pornographic
approaches often are.

230. A triage concept that has been floating around the SEC's halls for decades, the notion of
charging attempted insider trading took flight in the publicized action against Samuel Waksal,
Martha Stewart's alleged tipper. See Amended Complaint, supra note 201, at 1.
231. See Andrew Pollack & David Cay Johnston, Former Chief of ImClone Systems Is
Charged with Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at C l (noting the morning arrest of Dr.
Samuel Waksal at his home, as well as the subsequent setting of bail at $10 million). In June 2003,
Waksal was sentenced to over seven years in prison. See supra note 201.
232. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987); United States v. Dial, 757
F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that a stock broker's conviction under the mail and wire
fraud statutes were upheld because his trading ahead of his customers' block orders was found to be
fraudulent); Jenny Anderson, Arrest Highlights Risks to Secrecy in Stock Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2005, at C l (discussing a former NYSE floor clerk indicted on federal counts of securities fraud
and commercial bribery for tipping a day trader on "confidential information" concerning pending
large customer trades).
233. At the time of Martha Stewart's indictment, the Director for the Northeast Regional
Office of the SEC acknowledged the import of the case as a message to other chief executives,
pointing out that, if not addressed, insider trading "'suggests to investors that the game is rigged.'"
Jyoti Thottam, Why They're Pickingon Martha, TIME, June 16, 2003, at 46 (quoting Wayne Carlin).
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